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Centralize visibility of Kubernetes clusters across AWS Regions and accounts with EKS Dashboard

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Today, we are announcing EKS Dashboard, a centralized display that enables cloud architects and cluster administrators to maintain organization-wide visibility across their Kubernetes clusters. With EKS Dashboard, customers can now monitor clusters deployed across different AWS Regions and accounts through a unified view, making it easier to track cluster inventory, assess compliance, and plan operational activities like version upgrades.

As organizations scale their Kubernetes deployments, they often run multiple clusters across different environments to enhance availability, ensure business continuity, or maintain data sovereignty. However, this distributed approach can make it challenging to maintain visibility and control, especially in decentralized setups spanning multiple Regions and accounts. Today, many customers resort to third-party tools for centralized cluster visibility, which adds complexity through identity and access setup, licensing costs, and maintenance overhead.

EKS Dashboard simplifies this experience by providing native dashboard capabilities within the AWS Console. The Dashboard provides insights into 3 different resources including clusters, managed node groups, and EKS add-ons, offering aggregated insights into cluster distribution by Region, account, version, support status, forecasted extended support EKS control plane costs, and cluster health metrics. Customers can drill down into specific data points with automatic filtering, enabling them to quickly identify and focus on clusters requiring attention.

Setting up EKS Dashboard

Customers can access the Dashboard in EKS console through AWS Organizations’ management and delegated administrator accounts. The setup process is straightforward and includes simply enabling trusted access as a one-time setup in the Amazon EKS console’s organizations settings page. Trusted access is available from the Dashboard settings page. Enabling trusted access will allow the management account to view the Dashboard. For more information on setup and configuration, see the official AWS Documentation.

Screenshot of EKS Dashboard settings

A quick tour of EKS Dashboard

The dashboard provides both graphical, tabular, and map views of your Kubernetes clusters, with advanced filtering, and search capabilities. You can also export data for further analysis or custom reporting.

Screenshot of EKS Dashboard interface

EKS Dashboard overview with key info about your clusters.

Screenshot of EKS Dashboard interface

There is a wide variety of available widgets to help visualize your clusters.

Screenshot of EKS Dashboard interface

You can visualize your managed node groups by instance type distribution, launch templates, AMI versions, and more

Screenshot of EKS Dashboard interface

There is even a map view where you can see all of your clusters across the globe.

Beyond EKS clusters

EKS Dashboard isn’t limited to just Amazon EKS clusters; it can also provide visibility into connected Kubernetes clusters running on-premises or on other cloud providers. While connected clusters may have limited data fidelity compared to native Amazon EKS clusters, this capability enables truly unified visibility for organizations running hybrid or multi-cloud environments.

Available now

EKS Dashboard is available today in the US East (N. Virginia) Region and is able to aggregate data from all commercial AWS Regions. There is no additional charge for using the EKS Dashboard. To learn more, visit the Amazon EKS documentation.

This new capability demonstrates our continued commitment to simplifying Kubernetes operations for our customers, enabling them to focus on building and scaling their applications rather than managing infrastructure. We’re excited to see how customers use EKS Dashboard to enhance their Kubernetes operations.

— Micah;

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Configure System Integrity Protection (SIP) on Amazon EC2 Mac instances

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I’m pleased to announce developers can now programmatically disable Apple System Integrity Protection (SIP) on their Amazon EC2 Mac instances. System Integrity Protection (SIP), also known as rootless, is a security feature introduced by Apple in OS X El Capitan (2015, version 10.11). It’s designed to protect the system from potentially harmful software by restricting the power of the root user account. SIP is enabled by default on macOS.

SIP safeguards the system by preventing modification of protected files and folders, restricting access to system-owned files and directories, and blocking unauthorized software from selecting a startup disk. The primary goal of SIP is to address the security risk linked to unrestricted root access, which could potentially allow malware to gain full control of a device with just one password or vulnerability. By implementing this protection, Apple aims to ensure a higher level of security for macOS users, especially considering that many users operate on administrative accounts with weak or no passwords.

While SIP provides excellent protection against malware for everyday use, developers might occasionally need to temporarily disable it for development and testing purposes. For instance, when creating a new device driver or system extension, disabling SIP is necessary to install and test the code. Additionally, SIP might block access to certain system settings required for your software to function properly. Temporarily disabling SIP grants you the necessary permissions to fine-tune programs for macOS. However, it’s crucial to remember that this is akin to briefly disabling the vault door for authorized maintenance, not leaving it permanently open.

Disabling SIP on a Mac requires physical access to the machine. You have to restart the machine in recovery mode, then disable SIP with the csrtutil command line tool, then restart the machine again.

Until today, you had to operate with the standard SIP settings on EC2 Mac instances. The physical access requirement and the need to boot in recovery mode made integrating SIP with the Amazon EC2 control plane and EC2 API challenging. But that’s no longer the case! You can now disable and re-enable SIP at will on your Amazon EC2 Mac instances. Let me show you how.

Let’s see how it works
Imagine I have an Amazon EC2 Mac instance started. It’s a mac2-m2.metal instance, running on an Apple silicon M2 processor. Disabling or enabling SIP is as straightforward as calling a new EC2 API: CreateMacSystemIntegrityProtectionModificationTask. This API is asynchronous; it starts the process of changing the SIP status on your instance. You can monitor progress using another new EC2 API: DescribeMacModificationTasks. All I need to know is the instance ID of the machine I want to work with.

Prerequisites
On Apple silicon based EC2 Mac instances and more recent type of machines, before calling the new EC2 API, I must set the ec2-user user password and enable secure token for that user on macOS. This requires connecting to the machine and typing two commands in the terminal.

# on the target EC2 Mac instance
# Set a password for the ec2-user user
~ % sudo /usr/bin/dscl . -passwd /Users/ec2-user
New Password: (MyNewPassw0rd)

# Enable secure token, with the same password, for the ec2-user
# old password is the one you just set with dscl
~ % sysadminctl -newPassword MyNewPassw0rd -oldPassword MyNewPassw0rd
2025-03-05 13:16:57.261 sysadminctl[3993:3033024] Attempting to change password for ec2-user…
2025-03-05 13:16:58.690 sysadminctl[3993:3033024] SecKeychainCopyLogin returned -25294
2025-03-05 13:16:58.690 sysadminctl[3993:3033024] Failed to update keychain password (-25294)
2025-03-05 13:16:58.690 sysadminctl[3993:3033024] - Done

# The error about the KeyChain is expected. I never connected with the GUI on this machine, so the Login keychain does not exist
# you can ignore this error.  The command below shows the list of keychains active in this session
~ % security list
    "/Library/Keychains/System.keychain"

# Verify that the secure token is ENABLED
~ % sysadminctl -secureTokenStatus ec2-user
2025-03-05 13:18:12.456 sysadminctl[4017:3033614] Secure token is ENABLED for user ec2-user

Change the SIP status
I don’t need to connect to the machine to toggle the SIP status. I only need to know its instance ID. I open a terminal on my laptop and use the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) to retrieve the Amazon EC2 Mac instance ID.

 aws ec2 describe-instances \
         --query "Reservations[].Instances[?InstanceType == 'mac2-m2.metal' ].InstanceId" \
         --output text

i-012a5de8da47bdff7

Now, still from the terminal on my laptop, I disable SIP with the create-mac-system-integrity-protection-modification-task command:

echo '{"rootVolumeUsername":"ec2-user","rootVolumePassword":"MyNewPassw0rd"}' > tmpCredentials
aws ec2 create-mac-system-integrity-protection-modification-task \
--instance-id "i-012a5de8da47bdff7" \
--mac-credentials fileb://./tmpCredentials \
--mac-system-integrity-protection-status "disabled" && rm tmpCredentials

{
    "macModificationTask": {
        "instanceId": "i-012a5de8da47bdff7",
        "macModificationTaskId": "macmodification-06a4bb89b394ac6d6",
        "macSystemIntegrityProtectionConfig": {},
        "startTime": "2025-03-14T14:15:06Z",
        "taskState": "pending",
        "taskType": "sip-modification"
    }
}

After the task is started, I can check its status with the aws ec2 describe-mac-modification-tasks command.

{
    "macModificationTasks": [
        {
            "instanceId": "i-012a5de8da47bdff7",
            "macModificationTaskId": "macmodification-06a4bb89b394ac6d6",
            "macSystemIntegrityProtectionConfig": {
                "debuggingRestrictions": "",
                "dTraceRestrictions": "",
                "filesystemProtections": "",
                "kextSigning": "",
                "nvramProtections": "",
                "status": "disabled"
            },
            "startTime": "2025-03-14T14:15:06Z",
            "tags": [],
            "taskState": "in-progress",
            "taskType": "sip-modification"
        },
...

The instance initiates the process and a series of reboots, during which it becomes unreachable. This process can take 60–90 minutes to complete. After that, when I see the status in the console becoming available again, I connect to the machine through SSH or EC2 Instance Connect, as usual.

➜  ~ ssh ec2-user@54.99.9.99
Warning: Permanently added '54.99.9.99' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
Last login: Mon Feb 26 08:52:42 2024 from 1.1.1.1

    ┌───┬──┐   __|  __|_  )
    │ ╷╭╯╷ │   _|  (     /
    │  └╮  │  ___|\___|___|
    │ ╰─┼╯ │  Amazon EC2
    └───┴──┘  macOS Sonoma 14.3.1

➜  ~ uname -a
Darwin Mac-mini.local 23.3.0 Darwin Kernel Version 23.3.0: Wed Dec 20 21:30:27 PST 2023; root:xnu-10002.81.5~7/RELEASE_ARM64_T8103 arm64

➜ ~ csrutil --status 
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.

When to disable SIP
Disabling SIP should be approached with caution because it opens up the system to potential security risks. However, as I mentioned in the introduction of this post, you might need to disable SIP when developing device drivers or kernel extensions for macOS. Some older applications might also not function correctly when SIP is enabled.

Disabling SIP is also required to turn off Spotlight indexing. Spotlight can help you quickly find apps, documents, emails and other items on your Mac. It’s very convenient on desktop machines, but not so much on a server. When there is no need to index your documents as they change, turning off Spotlight will release some CPU cycles and disk I/O.

Things to know
There are a couple of additional things to know about disabling SIP on Amazon EC2 Mac:

  • Disabling SIP is available through the API and AWS SDKs, the AWS CLI, and the AWS Management Console.
  • On Apple silicon, the setting is volume based. So if you replace the root volume, you need to disable SIP again. On Intel, the setting is Mac host based, so if you replace the root volume, SIP will still be disabled.
  • After disabling SIP, it will be enabled again if you stop and start the instance. Rebooting an instance doesn’t change its SIP status.
  • SIP status isn’t transferable between EBS volumes. This means SIP will be disabled again after you restore an instance from an EBS snapshot or if you create an AMI from an instance where SIP is enabled.

These new APIs are available in all Regions where Amazon EC2 Mac is available, at no additional cost. Try them today.

— seb

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KrebsOnSecurity Hit With Near-Record 6.3 Tbps DDoS

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KrebsOnSecurity last week was hit by a near record distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that clocked in at more than 6.3 terabits of data per second (a terabit is one trillion bits of data). The brief attack appears to have been a test run for a massive new Internet of Things (IoT) botnet capable of launching crippling digital assaults that few web destinations can withstand. Read on for more about the botnet, the attack, and the apparent creator of this global menace.

For reference, the 6.3 Tbps attack last week was ten times the size of the assault launched against this site in 2016 by the Mirai IoT botnet, which held KrebsOnSecurity offline for nearly four days. The 2016 assault was so large that Akamai – which was providing pro-bono DDoS protection for KrebsOnSecurity at the time — asked me to leave their service because the attack was causing problems for their paying customers.

Since the Mirai attack, KrebsOnSecurity.com has been behind the protection of Project Shield, a free DDoS defense service that Google subsidiary Jigsaw provides to websites offering news, human rights, and election-related content. Google Security Engineer Damian Menscher told KrebsOnSecurity the May 12 attack was the largest Google has ever handled. In terms of sheer size, it is second only to a very similar attack that Cloudflare mitigated and wrote about in April.

After comparing notes with Cloudflare, Menscher said the botnet that launched both attacks bear the fingerprints of Aisuru, a digital siege machine that first surfaced less than a year ago. Menscher said the attack on KrebsOnSecurity lasted less than a minute, hurling large UDP data packets at random ports at a rate of approximately 585 million data packets per second.

“It was the type of attack normally designed to overwhelm network links,” Menscher said, referring to the throughput connections between and among various Internet service providers (ISPs). “For most companies, this size of attack would kill them.”

A graph depicting the 6.5 Tbps attack mitigated by Cloudflare in April 2025. Image: Cloudflare.

The Aisuru botnet comprises a globally-dispersed collection of hacked IoT devices, including routers, digital video recorders and other systems that are commandeered via default passwords or software vulnerabilities. As documented by researchers at QiAnXin XLab, the botnet was first identified in an August 2024 attack on a large gaming platform.

Aisuru reportedly went quiet after that exposure, only to reappear in November with even more firepower and software exploits. In a January 2025 report, XLab found the new and improved Aisuru (a.k.a. “Airashi“) had incorporated a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability in Cambium Networks cnPilot routers.

NOT FORKING AROUND

The people behind the Aisuru botnet have been peddling access to their DDoS machine in public Telegram chat channels that are closely monitored by multiple security firms. In August 2024, the botnet was rented out in subscription tiers ranging from $150 per day to $600 per week, offering attacks of up to two terabits per second.

“You may not attack any measurement walls, healthcare facilities, schools or government sites,” read a notice posted on Telegram by the Aisuru botnet owners in August 2024.

Interested parties were told to contact the Telegram handle “@yfork” to purchase a subscription. The account @yfork previously used the nickname “Forky,” an identity that has been posting to public DDoS-focused Telegram channels since 2021.

According to the FBI, Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains have been seized in multiple law enforcement operations over the years. Last year, Forky said on Telegram he was selling the domain stresser[.]best, which saw its servers seized by the FBI in 2022 as part of an ongoing international law enforcement effort aimed at diminishing the supply of and demand for DDoS-for-hire services.

“The operator of this service, who calls himself ‘Forky,’ operates a Telegram channel to advertise features and communicate with current and prospective DDoS customers,” reads an FBI seizure warrant (PDF) issued for stresser[.]best. The FBI warrant stated that on the same day the seizures were announced, Forky posted a link to a story on this blog that detailed the domain seizure operation, adding the comment, “We are buying our new domains right now.”

A screenshot from the FBI’s seizure warrant for Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains shows Forky announcing the resurrection of their service at new domains.

Approximately ten hours later, Forky posted again, including a screenshot of the stresser[.]best user dashboard, instructing customers to use their saved passwords for the old website on the new one.

A review of Forky’s posts to public Telegram channels — as indexed by the cyber intelligence firms Unit 221B and Flashpoint — reveals a 21-year-old individual who claims to reside in Brazil [full disclosure: Flashpoint is currently an advertiser on this blog].

Since late 2022, Forky’s posts have frequently promoted a DDoS mitigation company and ISP that he operates called botshield[.]io. The Botshield website is connected to a business entity registered in the United Kingdom called Botshield LTD, which lists a 21-year-old woman from Sao Paulo, Brazil as the director. Internet routing records indicate Botshield (AS213613) currently controls several hundred Internet addresses that were allocated to the company earlier this year.

Domaintools.com reports that botshield[.]io was registered in July 2022 to a Kaike Southier Leite in Sao Paulo. A LinkedIn profile by the same name says this individual is a network specialist from Brazil who works in “the planning and implementation of robust network infrastructures, with a focus on security, DDoS mitigation, colocation and cloud server services.”

MEET FORKY

Image: Jaclyn Vernace / Shutterstock.com.

In his posts to public Telegram chat channels, Forky has hardly attempted to conceal his whereabouts or identity. In countless chat conversations indexed by Unit 221B, Forky could be seen talking about everyday life in Brazil, often remarking on the extremely low or high prices in Brazil for a range of goods, from computer and networking gear to narcotics and food.

Reached via Telegram, Forky claimed he was “not involved in this type of illegal actions for years now,” and that the project had been taken over by other unspecified developers. Forky initially told KrebsOnSecurity he had been out of the botnet scene for years, only to concede this wasn’t true when presented with public posts on Telegram from late last year that clearly showed otherwise.

Forky denied being involved in the attack on KrebsOnSecurity, but acknowledged that he helped to develop and market the Aisuru botnet. Forky claims he is now merely a staff member for the Aisuru botnet team, and that he stopped running the botnet roughly two months ago after starting a family. Forky also said the woman named as director of Botshield is related to him.

Forky offered equivocal, evasive responses to a number of questions about the Aisuru botnet and his business endeavors. But on one point he was crystal clear:

“I have zero fear about you, the FBI, or Interpol,” Forky said, asserting that he is now almost entirely focused on their hosting business — Botshield.

Forky declined to discuss the makeup of his ISP’s clientele, or to clarify whether Botshield was more of a hosting provider or a DDoS mitigation firm. However, Forky has posted on Telegram about Botshield successfully mitigating large DDoS attacks launched against other DDoS-for-hire services.

DomainTools finds the same Sao Paulo street address in the registration records for botshield[.]io was used to register several other domains, including cant-mitigate[.]us. The email address in the WHOIS records for that domain is forkcontato@gmail.com, which DomainTools says was used to register the domain for the now-defunct DDoS-for-hire service stresser[.]us, one of the domains seized in the FBI’s 2023 crackdown.

On May 8, 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the seizure of stresser[.]us, along with a dozen other domains offering DDoS services. The DOJ said ten of the 13 domains were reincarnations of services that were seized during a prior sweep in December, which targeted 48 top stresser services (also known as “booters”).

Forky claimed he could find out who attacked my site with Aisuru. But when pressed a day later on the question, Forky said he’d come up empty-handed.

“I tried to ask around, all the big guys are not retarded enough to attack you,” Forky explained in an interview on Telegram. “I didn’t have anything to do with it. But you are welcome to write the story and try to put the blame on me.”

THE GHOST OF MIRAI

The 6.3 Tbps attack last week caused no visible disruption to this site, in part because it was so brief — lasting approximately 45 seconds. DDoS attacks of such magnitude and brevity typically are produced when botnet operators wish to test or demonstrate their firepower for the benefit of potential buyers. Indeed, Google’s Menscher said it is likely that both the May 12 attack and the slightly larger 6.5 Tbps attack against Cloudflare last month were simply tests of the same botnet’s capabilities.

In many ways, the threat posed by the Aisuru/Airashi botnet is reminiscent of Mirai, an innovative IoT malware strain that emerged in the summer of 2016 and successfully out-competed virtually all other IoT malware strains in existence at the time.

As first revealed by KrebsOnSecurity in January 2017, the Mirai authors were two U.S. men who co-ran a DDoS mitigation service — even as they were selling far more lucrative DDoS-for-hire services using the most powerful botnet on the planet.

Less than a week after the Mirai botnet was used in a days-long DDoS against KrebsOnSecurity, the Mirai authors published the source code to their botnet so that they would not be the only ones in possession of it in the event of their arrest by federal investigators.

Ironically, the leaking of the Mirai source is precisely what led to the eventual unmasking and arrest of the Mirai authors, who went on to serve probation sentences that required them to consult with FBI investigators on DDoS investigations. But that leak also rapidly led to the creation of dozens of Mirai botnet clones, many of which were harnessed to fuel their own powerful DDoS-for-hire services.

Menscher told KrebsOnSecurity that as counterintuitive as it may sound, the Internet as a whole would probably be better off if the source code for Aisuru became public knowledge. After all, he said, the people behind Aisuru are in constant competition with other IoT botnet operators who are all striving to commandeer a finite number of vulnerable IoT devices globally.

Such a development would almost certainly cause a proliferation of Aisuru botnet clones, he said, but at least then the overall firepower from each individual botnet would be greatly diminished — or at least within range of the mitigation capabilities of most DDoS protection providers.

Barring a source code leak, Menscher said, it would be nice if someone published the full list of software exploits being used by the Aisuru operators to grow their botnet so quickly.

“Part of the reason Mirai was so dangerous was that it effectively took out competing botnets,” he said. “This attack somehow managed to compromise all these boxes that nobody else knows about. Ideally, we’d want to see that fragmented out, so that no [individual botnet operator] controls too much.”

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Introducing the AWS Product Lifecycle page and AWS service availability updates

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Today, we’re introducing the AWS Product Lifecycle page, a centralized resource that provides comprehensive information about service availability changes across AWS.

The new AWS Product Lifecycle page consolidates all service availability information in one convenient location. This dedicated resource offers detailed visibility into three key categories of changes: 1) services closing access to new customers, 2) services that have announced end of support, and 3) services that have reached their end of support date. For each service listed, you can access specific end-of-support dates, recommended migration paths, and links to relevant documentation, enabling more efficient planning for service transitions.

The AWS Product Lifecycle page helps you stay informed about changes that may affect your workloads and enables more efficient planning for service transitions. The centralized nature of this resource reduces the time and effort needed to track service lifecycle information, allowing you to focus more on your core business objectives and less on administrative overhead.

Today, you will find information on the new Product Lifecycle page about the services and capabilities availability updates summarized in the following paragraphs.

AWS service availability updates in 2025
After careful consideration, we’re announcing availability changes for a select group of AWS services and features. We understand that the decision to end support for a service or feature significantly impacts your operations. We approach such decisions only after thorough evaluation, and when end of support is necessary, we provide detailed guidance on available alternatives and comprehensive support for migration.

Services closing access to new customers
We’re closing access to new customers after June 20, 2025, for the following services or capabilities listed. Existing customers will be able to continue to use the service.

Services that have announced end of support
The following services will no longer be supported. To find out more about service specific end-of-support dates, as well as detailed migration information, please visit individual service documentation pages.

Services that have reached their end of support
The following services have reached their end of support date and can no longer be accessed:

  • AWS Private 5G
  • AWS DataSync Discovery

The AWS Product Lifecycle page is available and all the changes described in this post are listed on the new page now. We recommend that you bookmark this page and check out What’s New with AWS? for upcoming AWS service availability updates. For more information about using this new resource, contact us or your usual AWS Support contacts for specific guidance on transitioning affected workloads.

— seb

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Hazy Hawk Exploits DNS Records to Hijack CDC, Corporate Domains for Malware Delivery

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A threat actor known as Hazy Hawk has been observed hijacking abandoned cloud resources of high-profile organizations, including Amazon S3 buckets and Microsoft Azure endpoints, by leveraging misconfigurations in the Domain Name System (DNS) records.
The hijacked domains are then used to host URLs that direct users to scams and malware via traffic distribution systems (TDSes), according to

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Join AWS Cloud Infrastructure Day to learn cutting-edge innovations building global cloud infrastructure

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I want to introduce the AWS Cloud Infrastructure Day to provide a comprehensive showcase of latest innovations in AWS cloud infrastructure. This event will highlight cutting-edge advances across compute, artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML), storage solutions, networking capabilities, serverless, and accelerated technologies, and global infrastructure.

Join us for AWS Cloud Infrastructure Day, a free-to-attend one-day virtual event on May 22, 2025, starting at 11:00 AM PDT (2:00 PM EDT). We will stream the event simultaneously across multiple platforms, including LinkedIn Live, Twitter, YouTube, and Twitch.

Here are some of the highlights you can expect from this event:

Willem Visser, VP of EC2 Technology will open with the introduction of the AWS journey since 2006, when Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) was launched with the goal of customer-obsessed innovation. He will speak about the progress made over nearly two decades in cloud infrastructure to support both startups and enterprise workloads based on scale, capacity, and flexibility.

You can learn how AWS developed beyond computing instances to create a complete cloud infrastructure, including the parallel evolution of services like storage and networking capabilities.

Todd Kennedy, Principal Engineer, GoDaddy, will share GoDaddy’s Graviton adoption journey and the benefits it reaped from Graviton. Todd will walk through an example to demonstrate moving Rust workloads to Graviton. Learn how GoDaddy achieved 40 percent compute cost savings and over 20 percent performance gains.

This event covers a variety of topics related to AWS Cloud infrastructure. Here are interesting topics that caught my interest:

  • Generative AI at the edge – You can learn how to select, fine-tune, and deploy small language models (SLMs) for on-premises and edge use cases due to data residency requirements using AWS hybrid and edge services.
  • Serverless for agentic AI auditability – You can learn how AWS Step Functions and AWS Lambda transform opaque agentic AI system operations into transparent, auditable workflows.
  • Accelerated computing – You can get a close look at AWS innovation across silicon, server, and data centers and learn how customers are using AI chips. Learn how you can get started and reduce your generative AI costs.
  • Networking capability – You can learn how AWS infrastructure—from physical fiber to software-defined networking—enables unparalleled performance and reliability at global scale. The session covers modern application networking patterns while emphasizing secure connectivity solutions for hybrid environments.

This event is perfect for technical decision-makers and developers and offers deep technical insights and hands-on demonstrations of the latest AWS Cloud infrastructure solutions.

To learn more details, review the event schedule and register for AWS Cloud Infrastructure Day.

— Channy

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