As the summer event season kicks off, venue managers and security firms aim to make AI part of the solution for keeping control of crowds and protecting against cyber-physical threats.
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As the summer event season kicks off, venue managers and security firms aim to make AI part of the solution for keeping control of crowds and protecting against cyber-physical threats.
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The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Thursday revealed that Commvault is monitoring cyber threat activity targeting applications hosted in their Microsoft Azure cloud environment.
“Threat actors may have accessed client secrets for Commvault’s (Metallic) Microsoft 365 (M365) backup software-as-a-service (SaaS) solution, hosted in Azure,” the agency said.
“This
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Anthropic launched the next generation of Claude models today—Opus 4 and Sonnet 4—designed for coding, advanced reasoning, and the support of the next generation of capable, autonomous AI agents. Both models are now generally available in Amazon Bedrock, giving developers immediate access to both the model’s advanced reasoning and agentic capabilities.
Amazon Bedrock expands your AI choices with Anthropic’s most advanced models, giving you the freedom to build transformative applications with enterprise-grade security and responsible AI controls. Both models extend what’s possible with AI systems by improving task planning, tool use, and agent steerability.
With Opus 4’s advanced intelligence, you can build agents that handle long-running, high-context tasks like refactoring large codebases, synthesizing research, or coordinating cross-functional enterprise operations. Sonnet 4 is optimized for efficiency at scale, making it a strong fit as a subagent or for high-volume tasks like code reviews, bug fixes, and production-grade content generation.
When building with generative AI, many developers work on long-horizon tasks. These workflows require deep, sustained reasoning, often involving multistep processes, planning across large contexts, and synthesizing diverse inputs over extended timeframes. Good examples of these workflows are developer AI agents that help you to refactor or transform large projects. Existing models may respond quickly and fluently, but maintaining coherence and context over time—especially in areas like coding, research, or enterprise workflows—can still be challenging.
Claude Opus 4
Claude Opus 4 is the most advanced model to date from Anthropic, designed for building sophisticated AI agents that can reason, plan, and execute complex tasks with minimal oversight. Anthropic benchmarks show it is the best coding model available on the market today. It excels in software development scenarios where extended context, deep reasoning, and adaptive execution are critical. Developers can use Opus 4 to write and refactor code across entire projects, manage full-stack architectures, or design agentic systems that break down high-level goals into executable steps. It demonstrates strong performance on coding and agent-focused benchmarks like SWE-bench and TAU-bench, making it a natural choice for building agents that handle multistep development workflows. For example, Opus 4 can analyze technical documentation, plan a software implementation, write the required code, and iteratively refine it—while tracking requirements and architectural context throughout the process.
Claude Sonnet 4
Claude Sonnet 4 complements Opus 4 by balancing performance, responsiveness, and cost, making it well-suited for high-volume production workloads. It’s optimized for everyday development tasks with enhanced performance, such as powering code reviews, implementing bug fixes, and new feature development with immediate feedback loops. It can also power production-ready AI assistants for near real-time applications. Sonnet 4 is a drop-in replacement from Claude Sonnet 3.7. In multi-agent systems, Sonnet 4 performs well as a task-specific subagent—handling responsibilities like targeted code reviews, search and retrieval, or isolated feature development within a broader pipeline. You can also use Sonnet 4 to manage continuous integration and delivery (CI/CD) pipelines, perform bug triage, or integrate APIs, all while maintaining high throughput and developer-aligned output.
Opus 4 and Sonnet 4 are hybrid reasoning models offering two modes: near-instant responses and extended thinking for deeper reasoning. You can choose near-instant responses for interactive applications, or enable extended thinking when a request benefits from deeper analysis and planning. Thinking is especially useful for long-context reasoning tasks in areas like software engineering, math, or scientific research. By configuring the model’s thinking budget—for example, by setting a maximum token count—you can tune the tradeoff between latency and answer depth to fit your workload.
How to get started
To see Opus 4 or Sonnet 4 in action, enable the new model in your AWS account. Then, you can start coding using the Bedrock Converse API with model IDanthropic.claude-opus-4-20250514-v1:0 for Opus 4 and anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-20250514-v1:0 for Sonnet 4. We recommend using the Converse API, because it provides a consistent API that works with all Amazon Bedrock models that support messages. This means you can write code one time and use it with different models.
For example, let’s imagine I write an agent to review code before merging changes in a code repository. I write the following code that uses the Bedrock Converse API to send a system and user prompts. Then, the agent consumes the streamed result.
private let modelId = "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-20250514-v1:0"
// Define the system prompt that instructs Claude how to respond
let systemPrompt = """
You are a senior iOS developer with deep expertise in Swift, especially Swift 6 concurrency. Your job is to perform a code review focused on identifying concurrency-related edge cases, potential race conditions, and misuse of Swift concurrency primitives such as Task, TaskGroup, Sendable, @MainActor, and @preconcurrency.
You should review the code carefully and flag any patterns or logic that may cause unexpected behavior in concurrent environments, such as accessing shared mutable state without proper isolation, incorrect actor usage, or non-Sendable types crossing concurrency boundaries.
Explain your reasoning in precise technical terms, and provide recommendations to improve safety, predictability, and correctness. When appropriate, suggest concrete code changes or refactorings using idiomatic Swift 6
"""
let system: BedrockRuntimeClientTypes.SystemContentBlock = .text(systemPrompt)
// Create the user message with text prompt and image
let userPrompt = """
Can you review the following Swift code for concurrency issues? Let me know what could go wrong and how to fix it.
"""
let prompt: BedrockRuntimeClientTypes.ContentBlock = .text(userPrompt)
// Create the user message with both text and image content
let userMessage = BedrockRuntimeClientTypes.Message(
content: [prompt],
role: .user
)
// Initialize the messages array with the user message
var messages: [BedrockRuntimeClientTypes.Message] = []
messages.append(userMessage)
// Configure the inference parameters
let inferenceConfig: BedrockRuntimeClientTypes.InferenceConfiguration = .init(maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.0)
// Create the input for the Converse API with streaming
let input = ConverseStreamInput(inferenceConfig: inferenceConfig, messages: messages, modelId: modelId, system: [system])
// Make the streaming request
do {
// Process the stream
let response = try await bedrockClient.converseStream(input: input)
// Iterate through the stream events
for try await event in stream {
switch event {
case .messagestart:
print("AI-assistant started to stream"")
case let .contentblockdelta(deltaEvent):
// Handle text content as it arrives
if case let .text(text) = deltaEvent.delta {
self.streamedResponse + = text
print(text, termination: "")
}
case .messagestop:
print("\n\nStream ended")
// Create a complete assistant message from the streamed response
let assistantMessage = BedrockRuntimeClientTypes.Message(
content: [.text(self.streamedResponse)],
role: .assistant
)
messages.append(assistantMessage)
default:
break
}
}
To help you get started, my colleague Dennis maintains a broad range of code examples for multiple use cases and a variety of programming languages.
Available today in Amazon Bedrock
This release gives developers immediate access in Amazon Bedrock, a fully managed, serverless service, to the next generation of Claude models developed by Anthropic. Whether you’re already building with Claude in Amazon Bedrock or just getting started, this seamless access makes it faster to experiment, prototype, and scale with cutting-edge foundation models—without managing infrastructure or complex integrations.
Claude Opus 4 is available in the following AWS Regions in North America: US East (Ohio, N. Virginia) and US West (Oregon). Claude Sonnet 4 is available not only in AWS Regions in North America but also in APAC, and Europe: US East (Ohio, N. Virginia), US West (Oregon), Asia Pacific (Hyderabad, Mumbai, Osaka, Seoul, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo), and Europe (Spain). You can access the two models through cross-Region inference. Cross-Region inference helps to automatically select the optimal AWS Region within your geography to process your inference request.
Opus 4 tackles your most challenging development tasks, while Sonnet 4 excels at routine work with its optimal balance of speed and capability.
Learn more about the pricing and how to use these new models in Amazon Bedrock today!
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DeepSeek’s risks must be carefully considered, and ultimately mitigated, in order to enjoy the many benefits of generative AI in a manner that is safe and secure for all organizations and users.
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Even after a fix was issued, lingering prompt injection risks in GitLab’s AI assistant might allow attackers to indirectly deliver developers malware, dirty links, and more.
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Even after a fix was issued, lingering prompt injection risks in GitLab’s AI assistant might allow attackers to indirectly deliver developers malware, dirty links, and more.
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Today, we are announcing EKS Dashboard, a centralized display that enables cloud architects and cluster administrators to maintain organization-wide visibility across their Kubernetes clusters. With EKS Dashboard, customers can now monitor clusters deployed across different AWS Regions and accounts through a unified view, making it easier to track cluster inventory, assess compliance, and plan operational activities like version upgrades.
As organizations scale their Kubernetes deployments, they often run multiple clusters across different environments to enhance availability, ensure business continuity, or maintain data sovereignty. However, this distributed approach can make it challenging to maintain visibility and control, especially in decentralized setups spanning multiple Regions and accounts. Today, many customers resort to third-party tools for centralized cluster visibility, which adds complexity through identity and access setup, licensing costs, and maintenance overhead.
EKS Dashboard simplifies this experience by providing native dashboard capabilities within the AWS Console. The Dashboard provides insights into 3 different resources including clusters, managed node groups, and EKS add-ons, offering aggregated insights into cluster distribution by Region, account, version, support status, forecasted extended support EKS control plane costs, and cluster health metrics. Customers can drill down into specific data points with automatic filtering, enabling them to quickly identify and focus on clusters requiring attention.
Setting up EKS Dashboard
Customers can access the Dashboard in EKS console through AWS Organizations’ management and delegated administrator accounts. The setup process is straightforward and includes simply enabling trusted access as a one-time setup in the Amazon EKS console’s organizations settings page. Trusted access is available from the Dashboard settings page. Enabling trusted access will allow the management account to view the Dashboard. For more information on setup and configuration, see the official AWS Documentation.

A quick tour of EKS Dashboard
The dashboard provides both graphical, tabular, and map views of your Kubernetes clusters, with advanced filtering, and search capabilities. You can also export data for further analysis or custom reporting.
EKS Dashboard overview with key info about your clusters.
There is a wide variety of available widgets to help visualize your clusters.
You can visualize your managed node groups by instance type distribution, launch templates, AMI versions, and more
There is even a map view where you can see all of your clusters across the globe.
Beyond EKS clusters
EKS Dashboard isn’t limited to just Amazon EKS clusters; it can also provide visibility into connected Kubernetes clusters running on-premises or on other cloud providers. While connected clusters may have limited data fidelity compared to native Amazon EKS clusters, this capability enables truly unified visibility for organizations running hybrid or multi-cloud environments.
Available now
EKS Dashboard is available today in the US East (N. Virginia) Region and is able to aggregate data from all commercial AWS Regions. There is no additional charge for using the EKS Dashboard. To learn more, visit the Amazon EKS documentation.
This new capability demonstrates our continued commitment to simplifying Kubernetes operations for our customers, enabling them to focus on building and scaling their applications rather than managing infrastructure. We’re excited to see how customers use EKS Dashboard to enhance their Kubernetes operations.
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I’m pleased to announce developers can now programmatically disable Apple System Integrity Protection (SIP) on their Amazon EC2 Mac instances. System Integrity Protection (SIP), also known as rootless, is a security feature introduced by Apple in OS X El Capitan (2015, version 10.11). It’s designed to protect the system from potentially harmful software by restricting the power of the root user account. SIP is enabled by default on macOS.
SIP safeguards the system by preventing modification of protected files and folders, restricting access to system-owned files and directories, and blocking unauthorized software from selecting a startup disk. The primary goal of SIP is to address the security risk linked to unrestricted root access, which could potentially allow malware to gain full control of a device with just one password or vulnerability. By implementing this protection, Apple aims to ensure a higher level of security for macOS users, especially considering that many users operate on administrative accounts with weak or no passwords.
While SIP provides excellent protection against malware for everyday use, developers might occasionally need to temporarily disable it for development and testing purposes. For instance, when creating a new device driver or system extension, disabling SIP is necessary to install and test the code. Additionally, SIP might block access to certain system settings required for your software to function properly. Temporarily disabling SIP grants you the necessary permissions to fine-tune programs for macOS. However, it’s crucial to remember that this is akin to briefly disabling the vault door for authorized maintenance, not leaving it permanently open.
Disabling SIP on a Mac requires physical access to the machine. You have to restart the machine in recovery mode, then disable SIP with the csrtutil command line tool, then restart the machine again.
Until today, you had to operate with the standard SIP settings on EC2 Mac instances. The physical access requirement and the need to boot in recovery mode made integrating SIP with the Amazon EC2 control plane and EC2 API challenging. But that’s no longer the case! You can now disable and re-enable SIP at will on your Amazon EC2 Mac instances. Let me show you how.
Let’s see how it works
Imagine I have an Amazon EC2 Mac instance started. It’s a mac2-m2.metal instance, running on an Apple silicon M2 processor. Disabling or enabling SIP is as straightforward as calling a new EC2 API: CreateMacSystemIntegrityProtectionModificationTask. This API is asynchronous; it starts the process of changing the SIP status on your instance. You can monitor progress using another new EC2 API: DescribeMacModificationTasks. All I need to know is the instance ID of the machine I want to work with.
Prerequisites
On Apple silicon based EC2 Mac instances and more recent type of machines, before calling the new EC2 API, I must set the ec2-user user password and enable secure token for that user on macOS. This requires connecting to the machine and typing two commands in the terminal.
# on the target EC2 Mac instance
# Set a password for the ec2-user user
~ % sudo /usr/bin/dscl . -passwd /Users/ec2-user
New Password: (MyNewPassw0rd)
# Enable secure token, with the same password, for the ec2-user
# old password is the one you just set with dscl
~ % sysadminctl -newPassword MyNewPassw0rd -oldPassword MyNewPassw0rd
2025-03-05 13:16:57.261 sysadminctl[3993:3033024] Attempting to change password for ec2-user…
2025-03-05 13:16:58.690 sysadminctl[3993:3033024] SecKeychainCopyLogin returned -25294
2025-03-05 13:16:58.690 sysadminctl[3993:3033024] Failed to update keychain password (-25294)
2025-03-05 13:16:58.690 sysadminctl[3993:3033024] - Done
# The error about the KeyChain is expected. I never connected with the GUI on this machine, so the Login keychain does not exist
# you can ignore this error. The command below shows the list of keychains active in this session
~ % security list
"/Library/Keychains/System.keychain"
# Verify that the secure token is ENABLED
~ % sysadminctl -secureTokenStatus ec2-user
2025-03-05 13:18:12.456 sysadminctl[4017:3033614] Secure token is ENABLED for user ec2-user
Change the SIP status
I don’t need to connect to the machine to toggle the SIP status. I only need to know its instance ID. I open a terminal on my laptop and use the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) to retrieve the Amazon EC2 Mac instance ID.
aws ec2 describe-instances \
--query "Reservations[].Instances[?InstanceType == 'mac2-m2.metal' ].InstanceId" \
--output text
i-012a5de8da47bdff7
Now, still from the terminal on my laptop, I disable SIP with the create-mac-system-integrity-protection-modification-task command:
echo '{"rootVolumeUsername":"ec2-user","rootVolumePassword":"MyNewPassw0rd"}' > tmpCredentials
aws ec2 create-mac-system-integrity-protection-modification-task \
--instance-id "i-012a5de8da47bdff7" \
--mac-credentials fileb://./tmpCredentials \
--mac-system-integrity-protection-status "disabled" && rm tmpCredentials
{
"macModificationTask": {
"instanceId": "i-012a5de8da47bdff7",
"macModificationTaskId": "macmodification-06a4bb89b394ac6d6",
"macSystemIntegrityProtectionConfig": {},
"startTime": "2025-03-14T14:15:06Z",
"taskState": "pending",
"taskType": "sip-modification"
}
}
After the task is started, I can check its status with the aws ec2 describe-mac-modification-tasks command.
{
"macModificationTasks": [
{
"instanceId": "i-012a5de8da47bdff7",
"macModificationTaskId": "macmodification-06a4bb89b394ac6d6",
"macSystemIntegrityProtectionConfig": {
"debuggingRestrictions": "",
"dTraceRestrictions": "",
"filesystemProtections": "",
"kextSigning": "",
"nvramProtections": "",
"status": "disabled"
},
"startTime": "2025-03-14T14:15:06Z",
"tags": [],
"taskState": "in-progress",
"taskType": "sip-modification"
},
...
The instance initiates the process and a series of reboots, during which it becomes unreachable. This process can take 60–90 minutes to complete. After that, when I see the status in the console becoming available again, I connect to the machine through SSH or EC2 Instance Connect, as usual.
➜ ~ ssh ec2-user@54.99.9.99
Warning: Permanently added '54.99.9.99' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
Last login: Mon Feb 26 08:52:42 2024 from 1.1.1.1
┌───┬──┐ __| __|_ )
│ ╷╭╯╷ │ _| ( /
│ └╮ │ ___|\___|___|
│ ╰─┼╯ │ Amazon EC2
└───┴──┘ macOS Sonoma 14.3.1
➜ ~ uname -a
Darwin Mac-mini.local 23.3.0 Darwin Kernel Version 23.3.0: Wed Dec 20 21:30:27 PST 2023; root:xnu-10002.81.5~7/RELEASE_ARM64_T8103 arm64
➜ ~ csrutil --status
System Integrity Protection status: disabled.
When to disable SIP
Disabling SIP should be approached with caution because it opens up the system to potential security risks. However, as I mentioned in the introduction of this post, you might need to disable SIP when developing device drivers or kernel extensions for macOS. Some older applications might also not function correctly when SIP is enabled.
Disabling SIP is also required to turn off Spotlight indexing. Spotlight can help you quickly find apps, documents, emails and other items on your Mac. It’s very convenient on desktop machines, but not so much on a server. When there is no need to index your documents as they change, turning off Spotlight will release some CPU cycles and disk I/O.
Things to know
There are a couple of additional things to know about disabling SIP on Amazon EC2 Mac:
These new APIs are available in all Regions where Amazon EC2 Mac is available, at no additional cost. Try them today.
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Database expert Dominik Tomicevic highlights the limitations of traditional cybersecurity defense methods and why knowledge graphs could be a better avenue for the CISO to pursue
Data shows that the global cost of cybercrime will soar by four trillion dollars over the next four years, rising from $9.2 trillion in 2024 to an estimated $13.9 trillion by 2028. Does this mean organizations must simply accept cyberattacks, malware, phishing, and other threats as endemic and ever-growing challenges?
Not necessarily. Greater vigilance and innovation in cybersecurity strategies can change the trajectory. While embracing digital technologies and the cloud has undeniably boosted convenience and productivity, it has also introduced significant vulnerabilities. Increasing reliance on open-source libraries to speed development—rather than building all code in-house—has, in turn, exposed organizations to new and serious risks.
Traditional cyber methods don’t work anymore
But the benefits are simply too great to ignore. The drive toward digital, online, and cloud-based operations is unstoppable, as is the growing reliance on externally sourced or AI-generated code. The problem is that most current cybersecurity methods fall short because they rely on models that are too rigid—both in how they represent the world and how they adapt to change. This is where developers we work with have identified a better way to help curb these dangers, at least to some extent.
The reason current systems of record for cyber vulnerabilities often falter is that they are built on the relational data model, which functions much like a “phonebook.” A phonebook offers a static, alphabetical list of individuals—but real life is far more complex, shaped by friendships, families, workgroups, rivalries, and constantly evolving relationships. Static models simply can’t capture the dynamic nature of modern digital environments.
Attackers understand this. They don’t exploit static lists—they target the living, breathing web of human connections. In other words, they aren’t studying organizational charts or formal hierarchies; they focus on the real-world links between people, creeping through systems to exploit user permissions not in isolation, but as gateways into broader networks.
This is why social engineering is so effective. If one person is compromised, who else might be vulnerable? What systems do they access? Who do they interact with daily? Attackers are disturbingly good at tracing these pathways—and exploiting them to devastating effect.
There’s another key limitation with the phonebook model—or more technically, with traditional relational approaches to cybersecurity: speed. Moving fast is essential, but modeling real-world complexity with relational databases requires many JOIN operations, which quickly become computationally expensive. In a multi-step attack, it might take 10 to 20 JOINs just to assemble a clear picture, and by then, the process could either time out or consume so many resources that it becomes impractical.
Trying to defend against adversaries who map and exploit dynamic relationship networks is incredibly challenging. A bad actor can quietly slip in a change request to open port 40 in a cloud security configuration, and in a highly connected system, that single move could silently unlock 1,000 other doors—with no clear way of knowing where they are.
The key element in the security war is relationships
That’s not just a vulnerability. That’s a nightmare. What’s becoming clear is this: a better way to understand the complex relationships and interdependencies within cyberspace could not only strengthen defensive postures, but also enable faster, more decisive action.
In response, more and more organizations—whether protecting their own systems or building cybersecurity solutions—are turning to graph-based approaches to model relationships and information. After all, every employee’s access to business services and systems creates a connection—a relationship—between individuals and the resources they use.
Player No 2 has entered the game
Which is why graph technology matters: it models systems clearly and powerfully by representing users, systems, and data as nodes, and the permissions and connections between them as edges. This “graph thinking” isn’t new—it’s exactly how attackers view your environment during penetration testing. They don’t see a flat network; they see a connected web of relationships and look for paths they can exploit to move laterally.
Graph technology allows defenders to adopt the same perspective before threats emerge. At its core, graph technology is about relationships—and whether it’s employees and devices, users and applications, or systems and services, a graph database can accurately capture the complex way your organization truly operates.
Crucially, graph technology doesn’t just deliver better visibility—it also dramatically improves speed of response. Because graphs eliminate the need for complex queries and costly JOIN operations, problems can be solved on a linear, not logarithmic, timescale. Connections can be mapped in seconds, not hours, giving security teams the clarity and agility they need to stay ahead of threats.
So where does AI fit into this picture? The next natural evolution is leveraging machine learning, AI, and advanced data techniques. A graph-based approach not only strengthens cybersecurity today, it also lays a powerful foundation for future AI initiatives, enabling faster, smarter, and more adaptive defenses.
The potential of a graph-based approach to navigating the intricate network of relationships that underpin cybersecurity challenges is immense. However, without adopting smarter, more adaptive cybersecurity strategies, both businesses and society will continue to fall behind in the relentless battle against cyber threats—threats that often understand our systems and vulnerabilities better than we do ourselves.
The author is the CEO of knowledge graph leader Memgraph
The post It’s Time to Move Away from the “Phonebook” Approach to Cybersecurity first appeared on Cybersecurity Insiders.
The post It’s Time to Move Away from the “Phonebook” Approach to Cybersecurity appeared first on Cybersecurity Insiders.
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KrebsOnSecurity last week was hit by a near record distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that clocked in at more than 6.3 terabits of data per second (a terabit is one trillion bits of data). The brief attack appears to have been a test run for a massive new Internet of Things (IoT) botnet capable of launching crippling digital assaults that few web destinations can withstand. Read on for more about the botnet, the attack, and the apparent creator of this global menace.

For reference, the 6.3 Tbps attack last week was ten times the size of the assault launched against this site in 2016 by the Mirai IoT botnet, which held KrebsOnSecurity offline for nearly four days. The 2016 assault was so large that Akamai – which was providing pro-bono DDoS protection for KrebsOnSecurity at the time — asked me to leave their service because the attack was causing problems for their paying customers.
Since the Mirai attack, KrebsOnSecurity.com has been behind the protection of Project Shield, a free DDoS defense service that Google subsidiary Jigsaw provides to websites offering news, human rights, and election-related content. Google Security Engineer Damian Menscher told KrebsOnSecurity the May 12 attack was the largest Google has ever handled. In terms of sheer size, it is second only to a very similar attack that Cloudflare mitigated and wrote about in April.
After comparing notes with Cloudflare, Menscher said the botnet that launched both attacks bear the fingerprints of Aisuru, a digital siege machine that first surfaced less than a year ago. Menscher said the attack on KrebsOnSecurity lasted less than a minute, hurling large UDP data packets at random ports at a rate of approximately 585 million data packets per second.
“It was the type of attack normally designed to overwhelm network links,” Menscher said, referring to the throughput connections between and among various Internet service providers (ISPs). “For most companies, this size of attack would kill them.”
The Aisuru botnet comprises a globally-dispersed collection of hacked IoT devices, including routers, digital video recorders and other systems that are commandeered via default passwords or software vulnerabilities. As documented by researchers at QiAnXin XLab, the botnet was first identified in an August 2024 attack on a large gaming platform.
Aisuru reportedly went quiet after that exposure, only to reappear in November with even more firepower and software exploits. In a January 2025 report, XLab found the new and improved Aisuru (a.k.a. “Airashi“) had incorporated a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability in Cambium Networks cnPilot routers.
The people behind the Aisuru botnet have been peddling access to their DDoS machine in public Telegram chat channels that are closely monitored by multiple security firms. In August 2024, the botnet was rented out in subscription tiers ranging from $150 per day to $600 per week, offering attacks of up to two terabits per second.
“You may not attack any measurement walls, healthcare facilities, schools or government sites,” read a notice posted on Telegram by the Aisuru botnet owners in August 2024.
Interested parties were told to contact the Telegram handle “@yfork” to purchase a subscription. The account @yfork previously used the nickname “Forky,” an identity that has been posting to public DDoS-focused Telegram channels since 2021.
According to the FBI, Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains have been seized in multiple law enforcement operations over the years. Last year, Forky said on Telegram he was selling the domain stresser[.]best, which saw its servers seized by the FBI in 2022 as part of an ongoing international law enforcement effort aimed at diminishing the supply of and demand for DDoS-for-hire services.
“The operator of this service, who calls himself ‘Forky,’ operates a Telegram channel to advertise features and communicate with current and prospective DDoS customers,” reads an FBI seizure warrant (PDF) issued for stresser[.]best. The FBI warrant stated that on the same day the seizures were announced, Forky posted a link to a story on this blog that detailed the domain seizure operation, adding the comment, “We are buying our new domains right now.”
A screenshot from the FBI’s seizure warrant for Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains shows Forky announcing the resurrection of their service at new domains.
Approximately ten hours later, Forky posted again, including a screenshot of the stresser[.]best user dashboard, instructing customers to use their saved passwords for the old website on the new one.
A review of Forky’s posts to public Telegram channels — as indexed by the cyber intelligence firms Unit 221B and Flashpoint — reveals a 21-year-old individual who claims to reside in Brazil [full disclosure: Flashpoint is currently an advertiser on this blog].
Since late 2022, Forky’s posts have frequently promoted a DDoS mitigation company and ISP that he operates called botshield[.]io. The Botshield website is connected to a business entity registered in the United Kingdom called Botshield LTD, which lists a 21-year-old woman from Sao Paulo, Brazil as the director. Internet routing records indicate Botshield (AS213613) currently controls several hundred Internet addresses that were allocated to the company earlier this year.
Domaintools.com reports that botshield[.]io was registered in July 2022 to a Kaike Southier Leite in Sao Paulo. A LinkedIn profile by the same name says this individual is a network specialist from Brazil who works in “the planning and implementation of robust network infrastructures, with a focus on security, DDoS mitigation, colocation and cloud server services.”
Image: Jaclyn Vernace / Shutterstock.com.
In his posts to public Telegram chat channels, Forky has hardly attempted to conceal his whereabouts or identity. In countless chat conversations indexed by Unit 221B, Forky could be seen talking about everyday life in Brazil, often remarking on the extremely low or high prices in Brazil for a range of goods, from computer and networking gear to narcotics and food.
Reached via Telegram, Forky claimed he was “not involved in this type of illegal actions for years now,” and that the project had been taken over by other unspecified developers. Forky initially told KrebsOnSecurity he had been out of the botnet scene for years, only to concede this wasn’t true when presented with public posts on Telegram from late last year that clearly showed otherwise.
Forky denied being involved in the attack on KrebsOnSecurity, but acknowledged that he helped to develop and market the Aisuru botnet. Forky claims he is now merely a staff member for the Aisuru botnet team, and that he stopped running the botnet roughly two months ago after starting a family. Forky also said the woman named as director of Botshield is related to him.
Forky offered equivocal, evasive responses to a number of questions about the Aisuru botnet and his business endeavors. But on one point he was crystal clear:
“I have zero fear about you, the FBI, or Interpol,” Forky said, asserting that he is now almost entirely focused on their hosting business — Botshield.
Forky declined to discuss the makeup of his ISP’s clientele, or to clarify whether Botshield was more of a hosting provider or a DDoS mitigation firm. However, Forky has posted on Telegram about Botshield successfully mitigating large DDoS attacks launched against other DDoS-for-hire services.
DomainTools finds the same Sao Paulo street address in the registration records for botshield[.]io was used to register several other domains, including cant-mitigate[.]us. The email address in the WHOIS records for that domain is forkcontato@gmail.com, which DomainTools says was used to register the domain for the now-defunct DDoS-for-hire service stresser[.]us, one of the domains seized in the FBI’s 2023 crackdown.
On May 8, 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the seizure of stresser[.]us, along with a dozen other domains offering DDoS services. The DOJ said ten of the 13 domains were reincarnations of services that were seized during a prior sweep in December, which targeted 48 top stresser services (also known as “booters”).
Forky claimed he could find out who attacked my site with Aisuru. But when pressed a day later on the question, Forky said he’d come up empty-handed.
“I tried to ask around, all the big guys are not retarded enough to attack you,” Forky explained in an interview on Telegram. “I didn’t have anything to do with it. But you are welcome to write the story and try to put the blame on me.”
The 6.3 Tbps attack last week caused no visible disruption to this site, in part because it was so brief — lasting approximately 45 seconds. DDoS attacks of such magnitude and brevity typically are produced when botnet operators wish to test or demonstrate their firepower for the benefit of potential buyers. Indeed, Google’s Menscher said it is likely that both the May 12 attack and the slightly larger 6.5 Tbps attack against Cloudflare last month were simply tests of the same botnet’s capabilities.
In many ways, the threat posed by the Aisuru/Airashi botnet is reminiscent of Mirai, an innovative IoT malware strain that emerged in the summer of 2016 and successfully out-competed virtually all other IoT malware strains in existence at the time.
As first revealed by KrebsOnSecurity in January 2017, the Mirai authors were two U.S. men who co-ran a DDoS mitigation service — even as they were selling far more lucrative DDoS-for-hire services using the most powerful botnet on the planet.
Less than a week after the Mirai botnet was used in a days-long DDoS against KrebsOnSecurity, the Mirai authors published the source code to their botnet so that they would not be the only ones in possession of it in the event of their arrest by federal investigators.
Ironically, the leaking of the Mirai source is precisely what led to the eventual unmasking and arrest of the Mirai authors, who went on to serve probation sentences that required them to consult with FBI investigators on DDoS investigations. But that leak also rapidly led to the creation of dozens of Mirai botnet clones, many of which were harnessed to fuel their own powerful DDoS-for-hire services.
Menscher told KrebsOnSecurity that as counterintuitive as it may sound, the Internet as a whole would probably be better off if the source code for Aisuru became public knowledge. After all, he said, the people behind Aisuru are in constant competition with other IoT botnet operators who are all striving to commandeer a finite number of vulnerable IoT devices globally.
Such a development would almost certainly cause a proliferation of Aisuru botnet clones, he said, but at least then the overall firepower from each individual botnet would be greatly diminished — or at least within range of the mitigation capabilities of most DDoS protection providers.
Barring a source code leak, Menscher said, it would be nice if someone published the full list of software exploits being used by the Aisuru operators to grow their botnet so quickly.
“Part of the reason Mirai was so dangerous was that it effectively took out competing botnets,” he said. “This attack somehow managed to compromise all these boxes that nobody else knows about. Ideally, we’d want to see that fragmented out, so that no [individual botnet operator] controls too much.”
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